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flicting decisions. However, it is suggested that an analysis of the
individual cases in light of all their individual facts may serve to
clarify and perhaps resolve many of the apparent conflicts. See
Hardman, Spontaneous Declarations (Res Gestae), 54 W. VA. L.
REv. 93 (1952), 56 W. VA. L. REv. 1 (1954).

It is submitted that our court, on the facts here present, would
reach the same decision as did the Virginia court in the principal
case.
J. D. McD.

LANDLORD AND TENANT -

CONDEMNATION -

TERmINATION OF

the owner of a lot with a store building thereon, leased
the premises to D for a two year term for the purpose of operating
a business. The state highway department, desiring to widen the
highway, condemned a major portion of the leased premises, including the part on which the store building was located. Both P and D
were made parties to condemnation proceedings and were awarded
damages for their respective interests. P offered to relocate the
store building and continue the lease. Upon D's refusal to continue
the lease P brought this action for nonpayment of the rent. Held,
that condemnation of the major portion of the leased premises
terminated the lease, and with it reciprocal rights and obligations
of the parties under such lease, including the landlord's right to
rent. Affirmed. Farr v. Williams, 101 S.E.2d 483 (S.C. 1957).
LEASE.-P,

It is surprising that a question of such practical importance as
whether the appropriation of leased premises through eminent
domain abates the payment of rent, should not have been definitely
settled.
According to a majority of decisions, the taking of the entire
premises by condemnation proceedings operates to release the
tenant from liability to pay rent. See, e.g., Chrysoverges v. General Cigar Co., 163 La. 364, 111 So. 787 (1927); Newark v. Cook,
99 N.J. Eq. 527, 133 Ad. 875 (1926). There are perhaps only two
decisions to the effect that it is no defense to the claim for rent
that the whole premises have been taken for public use, it being
considered that the covenant to pay rent remains operative in spite
of the fact that the lessee no longer has any interest in the land.
Foote v. Cincinnati,11 Ohio 408 (1842); Foltz v. Huntley, 7 Wend.
210 (N.Y. 1831).
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A more controversial problem arises when only a part of the
leased premises is taken for public use. A condemnation of part
of the premises according to the majority rule does not affect the
tenant's liability to pay the rent. See, e.g., Leonard v. Autocar
Sales & Service Co., 392 Ill. 182, 64 N.E.2d 477 (1945); Parks v.
City of Boston, 32 Mass. 198 (1834). In Parks v. City of Boston,
supra, the court explained that the lessee takes his term, just as
every other owner of real estate takes title, subject to the right and
power of the public to take it or a part of it for public use. Such a
right is no encumbrance; such a taking is no breach of covenant of
quiet enjoyment. The lessee then holds and enjoys exactly what
was granted him, as a consideration for the reserved rent; which
is the whole use and beneficial enjoyment of the estate leased,
subject to the right of eminent domain on the part of the public.
If he has suffered any loss, it is not by the act or sufferance of the
landlord, but by an act of the public, against whom the law has
provided an ample remedy.
The practical objection to the majority view that a partial
taking does not affect the liability for rent is that, while it results
in giving the tenant a part of the damages for the taking of the
premises, on the theory that he will continue to pay the rent to
the landlord, it furnishes no security that he will do so. The result
may be that if the tenant is pecuniarily irresponsible the landlord
is without any possible remedy. 1 T=ANY, LANDLOED & TENANT
§ 182 (1910).
In some jurisdictions, including West Virginia, a taking of part of
the leased premises by condemnation discharges the tenant's liability for rent pro tanto. See, e.g., Milburn By-Products Coal Co. v.
Eagle Land Co., 93 S.E.2d 231 (W. Va. 1956); Uhler v. Cowen,
192 Pa. 448, 44 AUt. 42 (1899); Biddle v. Hussman, 28 Mo. 597
(1856).
In West Virginia the problem of the lessee's liability for rent
after condemnation proceedings is handled by statute. W. VA. CoDE
c. 37, art. 6, § 29 (Michie 1955), states: "Whenever the whole of
any tract of land is taken under the power of eminent domain, the
liability of any tenant of such land to pay rent thereon terminates
....

If any part . . . is taken the rent shall be reduced in the

proportion which the value of the land or interest taken bears to
the total value of the land." A similar New York statute has been
held to require an apportionment according to value and not by
area of land. Gillespie v. Thomas, 15 Wend. 464 (N.Y. 1832).
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The West Virginia statute was applied in the recent case of
Milburn By-Products Coal Co. v. Eagle Land Co., supra. In that
case the lessor and lessee entered into an agreement to sell a portion of the premises to the West Virginia Turnpike Commission
in lieu of proceedings in eminent domain. The court said, although
neither party had objected to the decree of the lower court allowing abatement of the rent for the remainder of the term, that
W. VA. CODE c. 37, art. 6, § 29 (Michie 1955), was applicable to
this situation and there was a pro tanto termination of the lease
as to the acreage sold to the turnpike commission. See also,
United States v. Alderson, 49 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.W. Va. 1943).
Although the court in the principal case may have opened
up a wide road by saying that condemnation of a major part of
the leased premises terminated the lease, it is submitted that the
correct result was reached because condemnation of a major part
of the premises in this situation did render the leasehold untenantable. The rule followed by the court in this case is consistent with the prevailing view in this country in regard to destruction of the leased premises; that is, the tenant's liability to pay
rent ceases when damage to the leased premises makes them
untenantable. 1 TwFANY, LANDLORD & TENANT § 182 (1910). It is
also submitted that condemnation of the entire fee of leased property is a stronger case in favor of termination of the rent, because
in such case there is no possibility of restoring the property to
the tenant in its original status. In the case of destruction of the
tenantable portion of the premises by an act of nature or fire the
damage can be repaired.
In Yellow Cab Co. v. Stafford-Smith Co., 320 Ill. 294, 150 N.E.
670 (1926), the court held with the majority view that taking of
only a part of the premises does not release the tenant from
liability to pay the rent, but the court went on to say that the
remaining part in such case must be tenantable in order to hold
the tenant liable for the rent. The Yellow Cab case, although one
of the leading cases on condemnation for public use, was not cited
by the principal case despite the court's lack of authority to support its holding. The principal case, however, chose to follow
another Illinois case, Corriganv. Chicago, 144 Ill. 573, 33 N.E. 746
(1893). This case held that when the whole of the premises is
taken, liability for rent ceases and the lease is terminated. This
seems to indicate that the court in the principal case considers that
the taking of the whole premises and rendering the premises
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untenantable are in effect synonymous, thereby actually only
reiterating the already ovenvhelming view in this country that
taking of the whole of leased property terminates the lease and
absolves the tenant from futher payment of rent.
It is further submitted that the West Virginia court may
reach the same result in a similar situation by our statute, W. VA.
CODE C. 37, art. 6, § 29 (Michie 1955), if the words "whole of any
tract of land" are construed to encompass untenantable property,
as was evidently done in the principal case. Once property is
determined to be untenantable it is for all practical purposes
completely useless to the lessee and should be considered destroyed
whether the act which renders it untenantable is from natural or
unforeseen causes or by eminent domain.
It should be noted however, that a taking under eminent
domain proceedings which absolves the tenant from his liability of
paying rent is not effected by the mere vesting of title in the
condemnor, but requires surrender of possession by the tenant.
Annot., 163 A.L.R. 679 (1946).
J.E. J.
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the engine off and leaving the key in the ignition. A thief stole D's
car and negligently collided with P's car. P brings action against
D for damages. Nonsuit; P appeals. Held, that failure to remove
switch key does not render owner of automobile liable for negligent
operation thereof by thief who steals it, especially where there is
no ordinance or state law against leaving key in ignition switch.
Affirmed. Williams v. Mickens, 100 S.E.2d 511 (N.C. 1957).
The instant case is only another of a rash of similar cases which
have appeared in the past two decades throughout the United
States. More than two dozen law review articles have been written
on the subject. See, e.g., Comments, 12 U. MiAmi L. REv. 120

(1957), 9 ALA. L. REv. 880 (1957). Therefore, this comment will
be confined to a brief review of the cases and the possible outcome
of a similar case in West Virginia.
In cases determining liability of an automobile owner to a third
party when an unauthorized driver is at fault, there is a dichotomy
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